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POLITICAL PARTIES, VIOLENT, AND CULTURE OF ELECTIONEERING PROTEST IN 
SOUTHWEST NIGERIA: THE 1983 EXPERIENCE
ABSTRACT
This paper is an examination of the political parties and culture of violent during the electioneering process in Southwest Nigeria. It focuses majorly 
on the circumstances that led to the 1983 political crisis in Nigeria most especially how it affected southwest. The paper also focuses of the activities 
of the two dominant political parties, that is, Unity Party of Nigeria and National Party of Nigeria and how their activities have created tautness in 
Southwest Nigeria. It explains the main reasons why violence engulfed the street of Oyo and Ondo, this is ranging from the slow and ineffective way 
the courts dealt with political matters and the patrician way security agencies went along with political violence. The reaction of Yoruba to show 
their displeasure and grievances to how shoddy the election of 1983 and the injustice also contributed to this evil of political violence in southwest. 
The paper concludes that the 1983 political crisis occurred as a result of inability of government and court of justice to do the right thing. The paper, 
however, derived its data from both primary and secondary sources.
Keywords: Political, Violence, Culture, Protest, Electioneering, Experience.
INTRODUCTION
Democracy is defined as the continuous process of promoting equal 
access to fundamental rights. In lieu of this, Ake argued that the struggle 
for democratic culture that can bring about real development in Nigeria 
is the one sustained by economic and political development based on 
centralization of power, and reliance on indigenous communities to 
provide some refuge from the centralized state. Lamidi and Bello argued 
that the struggle for democratic government in Nigeria during military 
era is almost the same as the Nationalist struggles. This is because both 
sides of the coin were dedicated to the struggle for emancipation. In 
general, the concept of democracy is used to describe a political system 
designed to widen the participation of ordinary citizens. All over the 
world where democracy is being practiced, constitutional election must 
be the norm. It is the constitution that generates a style of politics. 
Politics is propelled by political parties. Political parties as defined 
by these writers are a body of men united for the promotion of ideals, 
with a focus to usurp power through the ballot box. Furthermore, Remi 
Anifowoshe see political parties as a means of organizing the people 
so they can select from themselves an elite group which will control 
the process of Public Decision Making on their behalf. Before the 
independent of Nigeria in October 1, 1960, series of efforts have been 
made to form formidable political parties with the aims of controlling 
the machineries of government. At the early stage, there were five 
registered parties in Nigeria which were as follows: Great Nigeria 
People Party (GNPP), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigerian Peoples 
Party (NPP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), and Unity Party of 
Nigeria (UPN). Actually, there would been only three parties: UPN, NPN, 
and NPP. Even as the five parties emerged, the southwest surely had the 
five parties representatives operating in its domain, but the activities of 
two (NPN and UPN) seem to dominate the others. The fears expressed 
at the time of the lifting of the ban on politics that such practices as 
“horse trading, shifting alliances, sectional interests, and petty loyalty” 
would sabotage the new Republics were certainly, real.
The activities of the UPN and NPN created tautness in the Southwest 
of Nigeria. By the time of the gubernatorial elections on August 13, 
1983, the brawls in the streets, on the airwaves, and in the compounds 
where electoral bodies headquarters are located, had begun to usurp 
the actual voting itself as arenas of competition for, or resistance to, 
political power. Chief Bisi Akande, UPN candidate for deputy governor 
in Oyo, declared that if his party lost as a result of electoral rigging in 
the state, there were two lines of actions open to it: The court of law or 
the peoples’ judgment [1].
It is interesting to note that both line of action were invoked by 
the UPN. In Ondo state, where the carnage reached levels of public 
mayhem similar to those in 1964-5, entire families of politicians were 
wiped out, and hundreds of houses were set on fire including the state 
headquarters of the Electoral body. Even the Electoral body staffs 
were helpless to declare the correct result or face the obliteration of 
themselves and their families [2]. For instance, in Abeokuta, capital 
of Ogun State, the transmitter of the Federal Television Station was 
attacked and set on fire.
It could be recalled that in Oyo and Ondo where the electoral contest 
had suddenly become intense after a landslide victory of the UPN, the 
bloodletting and arson were greatest. As indicated, political violence 
has become a line of action to further pursue claims to power of political 
parties. In the case of the southwest, it was the struggle for power 
between the NPN and UPN that have prominently led to the violence. 
Political parties, elections, and political violence are woven together 
in the collective consciousness of Southwest Nigerian people [3]. One 
major cause of the polling chaos of 1983 was the effort by the NPN 
to move from being a ruling party whose strength exceeded that of 
other parties, to one which enjoyed a monopoly of power within the 
political system. The desire of the NPN is to usurp power from the UPN 
in the Southwest, or to be more precise Yorubaland [3]. The political 
machinery on ground was one that was very well oiled and the reclusive 
approach adopted by the political bigwigs that ruled Yoruba politics at 
the time created a crusty, cranky, unfriendly attitude toward the NPN.
In Oyo, the battle involved as much bloodletting as exchanging of 
vituperative words. Here, the NPN achieved strategic victory number 
three, with the declaration of Omololu Olunloyo of the NPN as governor 
in place of Bola Ige of the UPN. In Oyo, an even wider gap of 84% 
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(UPN) to 14% (NPN) in 1979 had been replaced by a more critical 
NPN “victory” of 58–39% in 1983. Such a hitch in the very heartland 
of Yoruba politics cannot be made without the mobilization of a 
wide range of establishments, capitals, and “informal” means by the 
victorious party [4].
Bola Ige went to court confident that the revelation of the many 
irregularities in the election would swing the governorship back to him, 
or, at least, result in the cancellation of the poll and the call of a new vote. 
Hundreds of thousands of voters in the key towns of llesha and Ibadan 
had not been able to exercise their voting rights on April 13 because of a 
variety of impediments [3]. And then, there was the case of Modakeke, in 
which the injunction obtained against the use of the fraudulent electoral 
register had been disregarded by FEDECO officials. The fact that the 
political lords of Yorubaland are adamant insular who prefer in any 
dealings with the outside regions (South East, North West, North East, 
North Central, and South South) to run the show rather than reason and 
maybe subordinately play politics with this outside region [3].
The inherent factor in Yoruba politics are the fact that politics in 
Yorubaland is insular in nature and the political chieftains do not 
intend changing this reclusive approach to politics [3]. Yorubas detest 
treachery and celebrate whenever a traitor is captured. The treatment 
given to characters like Chief Akintola, and co. comes readily to mind.
The tension, fear, and anger in Yorubaland had overflowed its cup 
thereby bursting into violence immediately election results were 
announced in 1983, every other facets of life collapsed in the South 
West created vacuum that was later filled by killings, maiming, stealing, 
raping, anger, frustrations., etc. [5]. The inability of the electoral body to 
curb the inefficiency of the judiciary to resolve political issues created 
this vacuum.
On balance, the courts gave the NPN what it sought. In addition to 
Shagari’s reelection, the NPN in the South West region was able to 
hold on to the near doubling of its governorship victories in Nigeria, 
capturing two UPN strongholds in the South West.
The dethronement of two UPN stalwarts from their governorship stools 
began violence that ate up the Second Republic [6]. The fact that the 
people had lost confidence in the courts allowed for violence to be 
pursued. By September 1983, politics had nearly completed its decay 
into a state of war in the South West region.
The events of 1983, hopeful, but hopeless situation began so much 
violence that was reminiscent of 1966 – lbadan and Akure were in 
flames almost immediately the elections were announced. The people 
had lost hope in the judiciary and were determined to make a change. 
Streets in the South West were littered with bodies, blood, and burnt 
properties [7].
The insular politics played by Yorubas had like in 1966 proven to 
be impregnable to so-called intruders. In the 1983 elections, one 
fascinating features of that era were the alliances. The Peoples Parties 
Alliances (PPA) was made up of UPN, NPP (following the breakdown of 
its initial accord with NPN), GNPP, and PRP. All four parties ganged up 
to stop the NPN for the 1983 elections. The activities of political parties 
backfired on them. The South West region was heavily hit by political 
violence.
The outburst of violence in the South West of Nigeria was more to do 
with perceived mind set of South Westerners of collaboration of some 
citizens (South West indigenes) with the Northern oligarchy to rule the 
West. These perceived traitors of the South West were bent on not only 
denying Chief Awolowo the presidency of the country but also upsetting 
the apple card by snatching some of the states, then controlled by the 
defunct Unity Party of Nigeria.
In Oyo State, Dr. Omololu Olunloyo was declared winner over the then 
incumbent, Chief Bola lge and Chief Akin Omoboriowo who had been 
deputy to the then incumbent Governor of Ondo state, Chief Michael 
Ajasin, were declared winner of the gubernatorial polls. Whereas the 
fires in Oyo soon burnt themselves out, and Olunloyo assumed office, 
Ondo state was a different kettle entirely. Omoboriowo left with his tails 
behind his legs, refused to return to claim or actualize his mandates. 
So much was lost as a result of this political violence. Hatred, evil, 
corruption, increased drastically creating a lingering pain among the 
people for a long time to come.
THE ELECTION OF 1983
Politically induced violence has been a recurring decimal in Southwest 
Nigeria, starting from as far back as the pre Independence era. As 
1983 comes near, the fear of political violence loomed large among the 
people of the southwest. The elections of 1983 been the main culprit. 
At the root of the violence that has characterized, the chequered 
history of Yorubaland have been perceived injustice, marginalization, 
oppression of a minority ethnic group (such as the minority among 
the majority like the Modakeke/lfe palaver) by a majority group, 
electoral fraud, imposition of unpopular candidates on the electorate 
or the ill-treatment of popular, grassroots politicians by unpopular, and 
dictatorial cabals.
An election is “free and fair” or “massively rigged” depending on 
the fortunes at the election of the candidates or party making the 
allegation [8]. The collapse of the Second Republic cannot be simply 
attributed to any particular act of omission or commission on the part 
of the politicians who took control of the offices to which they had been 
elected or appointed after October 1, 1979; or the Nigerian soldiers 
who intervened on December 31, 1983, cannot also be held responsible, 
merely by that act, for the collapse of the Second Republic [6].
In Yorubaland, however, history had told us virtually all aspects of 
the electoral, process become, at some moment or another, subject 
to disagreement. When the degree of trust sinks to a low level, as in 
1983, the controversies accumulate faster than they can be resolved [1]. 
The 1979 elections were concluded and were a success partially in the 
southwest [9]. The reason for the word partial to connote the election 
of 1979 was for, there were indeed proven and unproven allegations 
by various parties as regard the 1979 election. The accusations and 
counter accusations of rigging thrown by parties at each other makes 
the election of 79 inconclusive and party machineries were set in 
motion against each other to capture power in 1983.
In the best of circumstances, it is extremely difficult, even for political 
scientists, to define what constitutes a free and fair election. In a book 
titled “Elections without Choice,” edited by Hermet Rose [10] and 
others, the authors make the assertion that free, fair, and competitive 
elections associated with the western democracies, as opposed to 
“election without choice practiced by authoritarian regimes or one 
party democracies found virtually in most regions of the world is 
supposed to contain, inter alia, the following essential elements”[8].
Competition between political parties or candidates contesting an 
election and freedom of voters to cast their votes. This freedom 
entails the voters’ right:
a. To have his franchise recognized through registration
b. To vote without being segregated into categories dividing the 
electorate and revoking the idea of popular sovereignty
c. To cast his ballot free from external hindrance and in secret
d. To decide how to vote, even to spoil his ballot without external 
pressure; and
In  different  parts  of  our  country  especially  the  South  West  and 
South East political zone of Nigeria. All hell was let loose when 
perceived individuals were accused of trying to subvert the will 
of the people during the 1983 election. The events in Ondo, Oyo, 
Lagos, and Ogun, come readily to what the author meant.
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e. To expect his ballot to be counted accurately even if it goes against 
the wishes of those in power [8].
In our context, the 83 elections did not meet the above conditions. 
The 1983 elections were not the only set of difficult hurdles that the 
Second Republic needed to get over, but a process which brought into 
sharp relief the fundamental problems of the new political system itself. 
Moreover, one of the major premises why violence erupted in 83 was the 
inability of the constitution and the society at that period to look into 
the fundamentals that had disrupted party formation and politicking 
since Nigeria’s inceptions. The political culture in Yorubaland is 
captured by the following remark: Rigging elections has for a long time 
been as Yoruba as pounded yam or Amala [4].
Electoral fraud leads to disruption and this invariably combines with 
other factors leading to politically induced violence. Electoral frauds are 
not an evidence of a “commitment to democracy” but rather belong to a 
general social practice deeply embedded in the culture of party politics 
in the Southwest.
Against a background, of fear, unresolved disputes, sticking to an 
identity; the Yorubas wanted a peaceful resolution to the 83 election 
but with the attitude of the NPN and UPN nothing short of political 
violence would have emerged. The reports of malfeasance which 
showed from constituencies throughout the southwest as the elections 
commenced underage voters, the distribution of already thumb 
printed ballots, unauthorized possession of electoral materials, forged 
voting cards, impersonation, etc., could not be kept in any reasonable 
perspective, because each documented instance suggested how much 
of evil perpetration had been committed [11].
Within FEDECO, which swelled within a matter of months into an 
organization of a million employees of superintendent, an electoral 
machinery with, at its base, 160,000 booths, the reassuring voice of its 
Chairman, Ovie Whiskey, was sometimes out of harmony with the frank 
and revealing statements of its commissioners at the state level. One 
of these, Colonel Ayo Ariyo of Bende State, made it a point to warn the 
nation how unprepared FEDECO was?
The activities of the UPN and NPN created tension in the Southwest of 
Nigeria [12]. In 1983, there was only one relatively peaceful election 
and it is that of the Presidential election held on August 6. By the time 
of the gubernatorial elections on August 13, the struggles in the streets, 
on the airwaves, and in the compounds where FEDECO headquarters 
are located, had begun to supplant the actual voting itself as arenas of 
competition for, or resistance to, political power [12]. Overt appeals 
to the populace to resist the NPN’s fraudulent electoral conduct were 
made in increasing frequency especially by UPN militants in the western 
states. The UPN major newspapers made the following cautionary aim 
threatening remark: “No party should allow the NPN to monopolize 
violence to rig the elections. Men of brawn are met only in the NPN. 
Chief Bisi Akande, UPN candidate for deputy governor in Oyo, declared 
that if his party lost as a result of electoral rigging in the state, there 
were two lines of actions open to it: the court of law or the people’s 
judgment [13].
In fact, both line of action were invoked by the UPN. Throughout the 
Southwest states, thugs went about beating suspected NPN members. 
Some FEDECO headquarters were placed under virtual siege. In Oyo, 
Ondo, Ogun, UPN, and NPN officials kept vigil, watching each other 
and the FEDECO representatives, to forestall what each believed 
would be an attempt by the others to command a doctoring of the 
voting results [14].
In Ondo state, where the carnage reached levels of public mayhem 
similar to those in 1964-5, entire families of politicians were wiped 
out, and hundreds of houses were set on fire including the state 
headquarters of FEDECO. Even FEDECO staffs were threatened to 
announce the correct result or face the annihilation of themselves and 
their families. In Abeokuta, capital of Ogun State, the transmitter of the 
Federal Television Station was attacked and set on fire [9].
In those states such as Oyo, and Ondo, where the electoral contest 
had suddenly become intense after a landslide victory of the UPN, the 
bloodletting and arson were greatest. As indicated, political violence 
has become a line of action to further pursue claims to power of 
political parties. In the case of the southwest, it was the struggle for 
power between the NPN and UPN that have prominently led to the 
violence. Elections and violence are woven together in the collective 
consciousness of Yoruba people [13].
At 1.30 am on the morning of August 11, 1983, a long 5 days after the 
first elections were held, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was declared, reelected 
President of Nigeria by a vote of 12,037,648 to 7,885,434 (for his 
nearest rival Obafemi Awolowo) [3].
Shagari’s vote had doubled from his1979 total that of Awolowo had 
increased by approximately 40%. Of equal importance is the fact that 
Shagari obtained a minimum of 25% in 16 states of the Federation 
compared with 12 states in 1979 (which had then provoked the 
reinterpretation of his required vote spread?).
The three states which remained outside Shagari’s 25% plus column 
were all in the West: Ogun, Ondo, and Lagos. In Oyo, the scene of 
such bitter conflict in mid-August, Shagari and the NPN registered an 
increase from 12.75% in 1979 to 37% in 1983. Chief Awolowo refused 
to initiate legal action to challenge the NPN total votes. Politics played 
everywhere consumes energy because it is the gateway to wealth [7].
One major cause of the electoral disorder of 1983 was the effort by the 
NPN to move from being a ruling party whose strength exceeded that 
of other parties, to one which enjoyed a monopoly of power within the 
political system [14]. The desire of the NPN is to usurp power from the 
UPN in the South West, or to be more precise Yorubaland. The political 
machinery on ground was one that was very well oiled and the seclusive 
approach adopted by the political bigwigs that ruled Yoruba politics at the 
time created a crunchy, cracky, unfriendly attitude toward the NPN [14].
In Oyo, the battle involved as much bloodletting as exchanging of 
vituperative words. Here, the NPN achieved strategic victory number 
three, with the declaration of Omololu Olunloyo of the NPN as governor 
in place of Bola Ige of the UPN. In Oyo, an even wider gap of 84% (UPN) to 
14% (NPN) in 1979 had been replaced by a more decisive NPN “victory” 
of 58–39% in 1983. Such a reversal in the very heartland of Yoruba 
politics cannot be made without the mobilization of a wide range of 
institutions, resources, and “informal” means by the victorious party [5].
Bola Ige went to court confident that the revelation of the many 
irregularities in the election would swing the governorship back to him, 
or, at least, result in the cancellation of the poll and the call of a new vote. 
Hundreds of thousands of voters in the key towns of llesha and lbadan 
had not been able to exercise their voting rights on April 13 because of 
a variety of impediments. And then, there was the case of Modakeke, in 
which the injunction obtained against the use of the fraudulent electoral 
register had been disregarded by FEDECO officials [13].
Bola Ige, a veteran of many legal battles in Nigeria, came to court armed 
with an array of documents showing how FEDECO’s figures differed 
from those noted by party agents in many constituencies’ Ige’s appeal 
did not, however, succeed. The fact that these conflicting results had 
been registered on forms printed by Ige’s agents, because of a shortage 
of forms in the constituencies in question, led to their rejection by the 
courts. This ruling was sustained on appeal [5].
Surely, the irregularities glaringly displayed during the course of the 
1983 election began that chilling bloodletting violence in 1983. The fact 
that the events and actions of the NPN and UPN can be fingered as the 
immediate cause of the collapse of the Second Republic [5].
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Apart from the immediate causes of perceived injustice, marginalization, 
greed, electoral fraud, imposition of unpopular candidates on the 
electorate., etc., there indeed are inherent factors that makes politics in 
Yorubaland very violent. The fact that the political lords of Yorubaland 
are adamant insularist who prefer in any dealings with the outside 
regions (South East, North West, North East, North Central, and South 
South) to run the show rather than reason and maybe subordinately 
play politics with this outside region.
The inherent factor in Yoruba politics are the fact that politics in 
Yorubaland is insular in nature and the political demi-gods do not 
intend changing this seclurist approach to politics.
Whenever a Yoruba son goes out to reach out to politicians of other 
regions and takes a weaker position in the new arrangement with 
politician from other regions, then intends to lord its new found friends 
over the Yoruba people, an apparent rejection of such arrangement 
most often leads to violent clashes. Yorubas detest treachery and 
celebrate whenever a traitor is captured. Yorubas guard their identity 
jealously and its these kinds of arrangement made by some of their 
sons that always make politics in Yorubaland inherently volatile. We can 
easily cast our minds back at characters such as Chief Akintola, Chief 
Omoboriowo, Chief Omololu Olunloyo... and how their activities gave 
rise to violence [1].
The tension, fear, and anger in Yorubaland had overflowed its cup 
thereby bursting into violence immediately election results were 
announced in 1983, every other facets of life collapsed in the South 
West created b vacuum that was later filled by killings, maiming, 
stealing, raping, anger, frustrations, etc. The inability of the electoral 
body to curb the inefficiency of the judiciary to resolve political issues 
created this vacuum.
The Nigerian judiciary was even less able to fill its original role. The 
courts could not operate in any salutary way when drawn into this 
process of vote adjusting, of having to decide which of conflicting, 
and unquestionable, sets of results were most “improbable” which 
impromptu solution is most appropriate [12]. On balance, the courts 
gave the NPN what it sought. In addition to Shagari’s reelection. The 
NPN in the South West region was able to hold on to the near doubling 
of its governorship victories in Nigeria, capturing two UPN strongholds 
in the South West [5]. The dethronement of two UPN stalwarts from 
their governorship stools began violence that ate up the Second 
Republic. The fact that the people had lost confidence in the courts 
allowed for violence to be pursued. By September 1983, politics had 
nearly completed its decay into a state of war in the South West region. 
Judges cannot adjudicate wars; they can, if they choose, acknowledge 
the victors and vanquished [15].
The events of 1983, hopeful, but hopeless situation began so much 
violence that was reminiscent of 1966 – lbadan and Akure were in 
flames almost immediately the elections were announced. The people 
had lost hope in the judiciary and were determined to make a change. 
Streets in the South West were littered with bodies, blood, and burnt 
properties [4]. In some cases, witchcraft was introduced to fight each 
other. The NPN stalwarts were disappearing either by running away 
from the region or missing and not to be seen again.
The residence (South West region) increasingly panicked and 
desperately scattered away to where they could find safety. The 
violence had overwhelmed the federal government and on a daily basis 
countless numbers of people were losing their lives and properties. The 
continued incitement in the mass media by mostly the UPN stalwarts 
fuelled the streets with violence [5]. The two major actors in lbadan 
and Akure escaped. However, some other NPN bigwigs were not so 
lucky. Thuggery and police brutality appeared to have become a regular 
feature of the era. The people as at this time wanted some form of 
respite as houses, properties, human life,... etc., were lost to political 
violence. The insular politics played by Yorubas had like in 1966 proven 
to be impregnable to so called intruders. In the 1983 elections, one 
fascinating features of that era were the alliances. The PPA was made 
up of UPN, NPP (following the breakdown of its initial accord with 
NPN), GNPP, and PRP. All four parties ganged up to stop the NPN for the 
1983 elections. The activities of political parties backfired on them. The 
South West region was heavily hit by political violence.
The outburst of violence in the South West of Nigeria was more to do 
with perceived mind set of South Westerners of collaboration of some 
citizens (South West indigenes) with the Northern oligarchy to rule the 
West. These perceived traitors of the South West were bent on not only 
denying Chief Awolowo the presidency of the country but also upsetting 
the apple card by snatching some of the states, then controlled by the 
defunct Unity Party of Nigeria [3].
The skies were brightened by the fires lit by mobs angered by what 
they saw as electoral frauds especially in the Old Ondo and Oyo states. 
In Oyo State, Dr. Omololu Olunloyo was declared winner over the then 
incumbent, Chief Bola lge and Chief Akin Omoboriowo who had been 
deputy to the then incumbent Governor of Ondo state, Chief Michael 
Ajasin, were declared winner of the gubernatorial polls [14]. Whereas 
the fires in Oyo soon burnt themselves out, and Olunloyo assumed 
office, Ondo state was a different kettle entirely. Omoboriowo left with 
his tails behind his legs, refused to return to claim or actualize his 
mandates. So much was lost as a result of this political violence. Hatred, 
evil, and corruption [3] increased drastically creating a lingering pain 
among the people for a long time to come.
SOME PACIFIST MEASURES
Two main reasons can be adduced to be the reason why violence 
engulfed the streets of Oyo and Ondo – the slow and ineffective way 
the courts dealt with political matters and the partisan way security 
agencies went along with political violence. The government of Shehu 
Shagari and the Assembly had to think of something to curb the violence 
everywhere in the cities of the South West reglon [9], even though it was 
clear that the Federal government was overwhelmed by the activities 
of violence on ground. They knew something had to be done quickly so 
that power can remain in the hands of the NPN.
Drastically, government took action (at least from the FG level) against 
political violence, of course without the support of other parties, 
especially Yorubas who felt cheated at the perceived lordship of their 
Hausa counterparts. Yorubas love to adhere to their identity and 
this also includes political identity. The NPN although had in its fold 
prominent Yoruba sons was still seen by the masses of the South West 
region in the same way as the NPC (Northern people Congress) of the 
First Republic.
As far as the Yorubas were concerned, the NPN was an evolution of the 
NPC and as such could not be trusted. Even as the UPN continues to 
linger in one crisis or another, the UPN was still very popular with the 
people but not as what it was in 1979. The UPN had charismatic leaders 
who had a popular following. Followership in Yorubaland was based 
basically on trust and nothing else. Even at this, Yoruba politics were 
also heavily sentimental; issues, such as clan loyalty, remained a factor 
toward Yoruba politics.
Thuggery and associated violence manifested in every aspect of 
our political journey in Nigeria. The South West of Nigeria is 
prone  to  such  violence.  Thugs  have  become  private  armies  of 
political  stalwarts  creating  pandemonium  in  Nigeria.  Violence  is 
regarded  by  many  as  a  perceived  response  to  oppression  of  the 
people or the greedy, wish of the incumbent wanting to remain in 
office forever [11]. In different parts of our country especially the 
South  West  and  South  East  political  zone  of  Nigeria.  All  hell  was  let 
loose when perceived individuals were accused of trying to subvert 
the will of the people during the 1983 election. The events in 
Ondo,  Oyo,  Lagos,  and  Ogun,  come  readily  to  what  the  author 
meant.
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It was factors mentioned above that made the job of security agents such 
as the police very difficult. It was clear that the police was on hostile 
ground. The type of approach the perpetrators of the violence use were 
guerilla (urban guerilla). Like urban guerilla movements, they strike and 
disappear into the crowd. A crowd collaborates with the perpetrators.
In the event of an envisaged violence that may rear its ugly head in 
1983; there appeared in 1983 two studies of the 1979 election, each 
of which, by frankly revealing the variety of malpractices which had 
occurred, served as a grim for cast of what was in store for the country 
later that year.
The first study was written by a senior official responsible for the 
conduct of the 1979 elections, and the second was the work of two 
university academics (one of them a sometime journalist). Ahmadu 
Kurfi, drawing on FEDECO’s own report on the elections, pointed out 
that in 1979 surplus ballot papers had been sold to the highest bidder, 
that polling agents had thumb-printed ballots for those who paid them, 
that ballot boxes stuffed with pre-marked ballots were substituted for 
the real ones on the way to counting centers, and that the deliberate 
invalidation of ballots by polling and counting officials had occurred [8].
Ogunsanwo and Adamu similarly demonstrated in copious detail how 
members of the huge temporary bureaucracy recruited by FEDECO 
to conduct the elections, as well as police and other security officials 
assigned to guard against electoral malpractices, and finally, the 
officers, candidates, and supporters of the contesting parties engaged in 
extensive acts of collusion to manipulate various aspects of the electoral 
process [9].
The contention can be made, on the basis of the evidence accumulated 
by Ogunsanwo and Adamu, that Nigerian elections are principally a 
competition for control of the electoral machinery and, secondarily, a 
competition for individual votes. Any party which fails to win control 
of this machinery in a particular area, or to neutralize the influence 
of its opponents over the personnel operating the machinery, risks 
losing elections regardless of the actual support it enjoys among the 
electorate [6]. Issues raised such as the above makes it difficult for 
elections to pass through without dissatisfaction from the public. Hence, 
violence does erupt starting from the body conducting the elections, to 
the electorates, and also the machinery (as the police) was allegedly 
loyal to the government in which case is the Federal Government [9].
CONCLUSION
The collapse of the Second Republic was in the year 1983, a period which 
brought forth military intervention. The South West was invariably 
under a siege before the 1983 elections. There was no military strength 
to enforce peace or is it because of the biases of the NPN government 
that peace could not be achieved. The more democratic systems of 
courts were completely misused and rigging was intensely increased 
during the 1983 elections [9].
Yoruba politics as have always been involving “two faces:” An interior 
face, concerned with the allocation of reward to those who are loyal to 
the Yoruba self-interest and exterior face, concerned with maximizing 
the profit of this internal gain in an overall view of the Nigerian 
polity [12]. There is also added to these a sub ethnic consciousness that 
may sometimes trigger clashes with the broader Yoruba interest.
It may be a psychological, historical, sociological interest pursued by the 
sub-ethnic group or clan. Violence is a strategy to acquire power at all cost. 
The Nigerian soldiers (Muhammadu Buhari led coup) who intervened 
on December 31, 1983, cannot be held responsible merely by that 
act, for the collapse of the Second Republic, nor can the thousands of 
politicians and government officials detained and were tried when the 
military took over.
The collapse of politics can be adduced to the monster of political 
violence. Politician it would assume had learnt nothing from the past 
and politics still wear the inevitability of the collapse of the Second 
Republic were indeed glaring in the events that existed before 1983. 
The year 1983 marked and one of the most endowed countries in the 
world, arguably the most important.
Hope and anxiety defined the four years of the Second Republic. But 
hope soon petered out. Anxiety soon yielded the enormous violence 
that eventually brought the military back.71 So at the time a band of 
soldiers pounced on the Shagari administration removing them from 
power. Nigerians rejoiced once again. Giving the impression that their 
savior had come.
The riots, uprising during our period of study showed that people who 
are disillusioned and alienated from their authority react in certain 
situations. The riots were a protest by the majority of the Yorubas to 
show their detest to how shoddy the election of 1983 were and the 
injustice also contributed to this evil of political violence. The open 
disregard for the people’s wishes, as expressed through the ballot box, 
injustices perpetrated by the military, therefore created the immediate 
hostile climate for widespread riots and for attacks on the symbols of 
authority. As noted by post and Vickers:
The rebellion arose immediately from the conflict among political parties 
over control of the system of rewards. The Action Group crisis, which came 
into open in 1962, was mainly a struggle for power and control of the 
Western region between the various personalities and groups within and 
outside the Region. The same personalities clash also emanated its ugly 
head during 1983 election crisis that finally collapsed the Second Republic. 
If non-violent means of access to power (as through the ballot box) and 
redress of grievances are blocked, violence may become a substitute.
Although the Yorubas’ do consider themselves as a peace loving and 
traditionally non-violent people. The resort to violence during the 
period of 1983 was a last resort to their frustrations.
In the Western Region, an unhealthy rivalry created a volatile situation 
and explains why the Western region was always repeating past 
mistakes. Rival political parties (as to be said between the NPN and 
UPN) exploited the tension between the parties in 1983 and used this 
opportunity to undermine the stability of the region during the 1983 
crisis. The result of deep-rooted disunity among Yorubas’ that can be 
traced as far back as the 19th century became a cockpit of Nigerian 
politics in which outside regions of Nigeria sort to manipulate to 
achieve their political goals.
The suspicion by the Yoruba leadership to any outside interference by 
those from other regions in Nigeria has always backfired because this 
suspicion always engenders a lot of conspiracy theories that aggravates 
violence in the region. For example, it is a known fact that the Yorubas’ 
have seen the people from the Northern Region as a backward, 
conservative lot that are different from themselves whom they consider 
arrogantly as a progressive, modernized, educated people who were 
constantly pulled back by the North.
However, the crisis in the South West can be assigned to various factors 
which may not be primarily due to the processes of modernization 
alone. The factors to be identified by this writer are as follows; the 
In  Nigeria,  and  the  relentless  struggle  to  procure  individual  and 
group benefits via the temporary appropriation of public offices 
eventually reducing the electoral processes to a Hobbesian state of war 
[16].
For it is the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to be in charge of the 
police. When the South West went up in flames, the police loyalty was to 
the Federal Government since public opinion in Yorubaland was to the
 UPN, the NPN led Federal Government controlled the police making 
it difficult for the police to be trusted. This however does not mean 
that the NPN does not have a substantial share of supporters in the
 South West of Nigeria.
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internal divisions and quarrels of the Yoruba; the consequent “style 
of politics” – the insularity and distinctness of politics in Yorubaland 
– which had a profound effect on the political behavior of the Yorubas. 
All these factors can be adduced as reasons why political violence is a 
regular reoccurrence in that region.
The factors outlined and the violent events which they produced had 
far reaching consequences for political stability in Nigeria as a whole. 
Most observations sort by the writer, all have a canning believe that the 
events in the South West during and before the 1966 coup, the 1983 
collapse of the Second Republic have a direct or indirect undertones 
coming from previous clashes in the South West.
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